Gibbard and Moore
Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1):158-164 (2003)
| Abstract | This article has no associated abstract. (fix it) | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,653 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesJamie Dreier (2003). Comments: Gibbard and Moore. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41:158-164.
Laura Schroeter & Francois Schroeter (2005). Is Gibbard a Realist? Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (2):1-18.
Allan Gibbard (2006). Normative Properties. In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press.
Jamie Dreier (2006). Was Moore a Moorean? In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press.
Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.) (2006). Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press.
Jamie Dreier (2006). Disagreeing (About) What to Do: Negation and Completeness in Gibbard's Norm-Expressivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):714-721.
Christine Clavien (2009). Gibbard's Expressivism: An Interdisciplinary Critical Analysis. Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):465 – 485.
Nicholas Unwin (2001). Norms and Negation: A Problem for Gibbard's Logic. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):60-75.
Paul Arthur Schilpp (1952). The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. New York, Tudor Pub. Co..
James Dreier (1999). Transforming Expressivism. Noûs 33 (4):558-572.
John Greco (2002). How to Reid Moore. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):544-563.
Daniel Hunter & Reed Richter (1978). Counterfactuals and Newcomb's Paradox. Synthese 39 (2):249 - 261.
Philip Stratton-Lake & Brad Hooker (2006). Scanlon Versus Moore on Goodness. In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press.
Guy Fletcher (2008). 'Mill, Moore, and Intrinsic Value'. Social Theory and Practice 34 (4):517-32.
James Pryor (2004). What's Wrong with Moore's Argument? Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2010-09-14Total downloads14 ( #83,010 of 548,984 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,327 of 548,984 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
