How do you know you are not a zombie

In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate. pp. 1--14 (2003)
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2009-01-28

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Fred Dretske
Last affiliation: Duke University

Citations of this work

For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not.Dan Zahavi & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology. Routledge. pp. 36-53.
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Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Selfhood: a Reply to some Critics.Dan Zahavi - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (3):703-718.

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