Heterophenomenology: Heavy-handed Sleight-of-hand [Book Review]

Abstract
We argue that heterophenomenology both over- and under-populates the intentional realm. For example, when one is involved in coping, one’s mind does not contain beliefs. Since the heterophenomenologist interprets all intentional commitment as belief, he necessarily overgenerates the belief contents of the mind. Since beliefs cannot capture the normative aspect of coping and perceiving, any method, such as heterophenomenology, that allows for only beliefs is guaranteed not only to overgenerate beliefs but also to undergenerate other kinds of intentional phenomena
Keywords heterophenomenology  coping skills  belief  intentionality
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-006-9042-y
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (2004). Qualia. In Richard L. Gregory (ed.), Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford University Press

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Citations of this work BETA
B. Scot Rousse (2016). Merleau-Ponty and Carroll on the Power of Movies. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (1):45-73.
Joëlle Proust (2015). Time and Action: Impulsivity, Habit, Strategy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):717-743.
Donnchadh O'Conaill (2013). On Being Motivated. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):579-595.

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