David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 38 (4):423 – 430 (1995)
In their debate over my interpretation of Heidegger's account of das Man in Being and Time, Frederick Olafson and Taylor Carman agree that Heidegger's various characterizations of das Man are inconsistent. Olafson champions an existentialist/ontic account of das Man as a distorted mode of being?with. Carman defends a Wittgensteinian/ontological account of das Man as Heidegger's name for the social norms that make possible everyday intelligibility. For Olafson, then, das Man is a privative mode of Dasein, while for Carman it makes up an important aspect of Dasein's positive constitution. Neither interpreter takes seriously the other's account, though both acknowledge both readings are possible. How should one choose between these two interpretations? I suggest that we choose the interpretation that identifies the phenomenon the work is examining, gives the most internally consistent account of that phenomenon, and shows the compatibility of this account with the rest of the work
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Citations of this work BETA
Havi Carel (2007). Temporal Finitude and Finitude of Possibility: The Double Meaning of Death in Being and Time. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (4):541 – 556.
Carleton B. Christensen (2012). The Problem Ofdas Man—A Simmelian Solution. Inquiry 55 (3):262-288.
David Egan (2012). Das Man and Distantiality in Being and Time. Inquiry 55 (3):289-306.
Philip Darbyshire, John Diekelmann & Nancy Diekelmann (1999). Reading Heidegger and Interpretive Phenomenology: A Response to the Work of Michael Crotty. Nursing Inquiry 6 (1):17-25.
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