Meta‐ethics and the problem of creeping minimalism

Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):23–44 (2004)
Abstract
This is a paper about the problem of realism in meta-ethics (and, I hope, also in other areas, but that hope is so far pretty speculative). But it is not about the problem of whether realism is true. It is about the problem of what realism is. More specifically, it is about the question of what divides meta-ethical realists from irrealists. I start with a potted history of the Good Old Days.
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Hartry Field (2009). Epistemology Without Metaphysics. Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290.
Philip Brown (2013). The Possibility of Morality. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):627-636.

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