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- Gary L. Drescher (1991). Made-Up Minds: A Constructivist Approach to Artificial Intelligence. Cambridge: MIT Press.
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A survey of the main approaches in a mind study -oriented part of Artificial Intelligence is made focusing on controversial issues and extreme hypotheses. Various meanings of terms: "intelligence" and "artificial intelligence" are discussed. Limitations for constructing intelligent systems resulting from the lack of formalized models of cognitive activity are shown. The approaches surveyed are then recapitulated in the light of these limitations.
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