Precis of knowledge and the flow of information

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):55-90 (1983)
Abstract
A theory of information is developed in which the informational content of a signal (structure, event) can be specified. This content is expressed by a sentence describing the condition at a source on which the properties of a signal depend in some lawful way. Information, as so defined, though perfectly objective, has the kind of semantic property (intentionality) that seems to be needed for an analysis of cognition. Perceptual knowledge is an information-dependent internal state with a content corresponding to the information producing it. This picture of knowledge captures most of what makes knowledge an important cpistcmological notion. It also avoids many of the problems infecting traditional justificational accounts of knowledge (knowledge as [justified, true belief those (unlike knowledge) having a content that can be either true or false (e.g., belief) – are described in terms of the way internal (presumably neural) structures acquire during learning a certain information-carrying role. The content of these structures (whether true or false) is identified with the kind of information they were developed to carry
Keywords belief   cognition   concept   information   intentionality   knowledge   meaning   perception   representation   semantics
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References found in this work BETA
Fred Dretske (1971). Conclusive Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1 – 22.
Fred Dretske (1969). Seeing And Knowing. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Thomas Metzinger & Vittorio Gallese (2003). Of Course They Do. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):574-576.

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