David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):55-90 (1983)
A theory of information is developed in which the informational content of a signal (structure, event) can be specified. This content is expressed by a sentence describing the condition at a source on which the properties of a signal depend in some lawful way. Information, as so defined, though perfectly objective, has the kind of semantic property (intentionality) that seems to be needed for an analysis of cognition. Perceptual knowledge is an information-dependent internal state with a content corresponding to the information producing it. This picture of knowledge captures most of what makes knowledge an important cpistcmological notion. It also avoids many of the problems infecting traditional justificational accounts of knowledge (knowledge as [justified, true belief those (unlike knowledge) having a content that can be either true or false (e.g., belief) – are described in terms of the way internal (presumably neural) structures acquire during learning a certain information-carrying role. The content of these structures (whether true or false) is identified with the kind of information they were developed to carry
|Keywords||belief cognition concept information intentionality knowledge meaning perception representation semantics|
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References found in this work BETA
Paul M. Churchland (1979). Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Edmund Gettier (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
John R. Searle (1980). Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
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Citations of this work BETA
Kenneth M. Sayre (1986). Intentionality and Information Processing: An Alternative Model for Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):121-38.
Henry E. Kyburg (1983). Rational Belief. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):231.
Andrea Scarantino (2015). Information as a Probabilistic Difference Maker. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):419-443.
Lola L. Lopes (1983). Normative Theories of Rationality: Occam's Razor, Procrustes' Bed? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):255.
Daniel C. Dennett (1985). When Does the Intentional Stance Work? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):763.
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