David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 55 (1):3 - 19 (1983)
By examining the general conditions in which a structure could come to represent another state of affairs, it is argued that beliefs, a special class of representations, have their contents limited by the sort of information the system in which they occur can pick up and process. If a system — measuring instrument, animal or human being — cannot process information to the effect that something is Q, it cannot represent something as Q. From this it follows (for simple, ostensively acquired concepts at least) that if an organism has the concept Q, if it can believe that things are Q, then it is the kind of organism that has the information-processing capabilities for knowing that something is Q.
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Neil Van Leeuwen (2014). Religious Credence is Not Factual Belief. Cognition 133 (3):698-715.
Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri (2015). Belief Through Thick and Thin. Noûs 49 (4):748-775.
Peter Godfrey-Smith (1992). Indication and Adaptation. Synthese 92 (2):283-312.
Dennis W. Stampe (1986). Verificationism and a Causal Account of Meaning. Synthese 69 (October):107-37.
Marius Usher (2004). Comment on Ryder's SINBAD Neurosemantics: Is Teleofunction Isomorphism the Way to Understand Representations? Mind and Language 19 (2):241-248.
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