The logical form of universal generalizations

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):373 – 393 (2005)
Abstract
First order logic does not distinguish between different forms of universal generalization; in this paper I argue that lawlike and accidental generalizations (broadly construed) have a different logical form, and that this distinction is syntactically marked in English. I then consider the relevance of this broader conception of lawlikeness to the philosophy of science.
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    Nirit Kadmon & Fred Landman (1993). Any. Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (4):353 - 422.
    Harold Kincaid (1990). Defending Laws in the Social Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20 (1):56?83.

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