David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (3):287–302 (2000)
Husserl and Searle agree that, for a bodily movement to be an action, it must be caused by a propositional representation. Husserl's representation is a mental state whose intentional content is what the agent is trying to do; Searle thinks of the representation as a logical structure expressing the action's conditions of satisfaction. Merleau-Ponty criticises both views by introducing a kind of activity he calls motor intentionality, in which the agent, rather than aiming at success, feels drawn to reduce a felt tension. I argue that Searle can account for Merleau-Ponty's kind of coping only by broadening his notion of propositional representation to include indexicals, but that, in so doing, he covers up the way representational intentionality depends upon motor intentionality
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Steven Levine (2012). Norms and Habits: Brandom on the Sociality of Action. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):n/a-n/a.
Gabriel Gottlieb (2011). Unreflective Action and the Argument From Speed. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):338-362.
Donnchadh O'Conaill (2013). On Being Motivated. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):579-595.
Similar books and articles
David Cunning (1999). Agency and Consciousness. Synthese 120 (2):271-294.
Thomas M. Seebohm (2002). The Phenomenological Movement: A Tradition Without Method? Merleau-Ponty and Husserl. In Merleau-Ponty's Reading of Husserl. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.
Sara Heinämaa (1999). Merleau-Ponty's Modification of Phenomenology: Cognition, Passion and Philosophy. Synthese 118 (1):49-68.
John R. Searle (1979). The Intentionality of Intention and Action. Inquiry 22 (1-4):253 – 280.
Christian Beyer (1997). Hussearle's Representationalism and the “Hypothesis of the Background”. Synthese 112 (3):323-352.
M. C. Dillon (1971). Gestalt Theory and Merleau-Ponty's Concept of Intentionality. Man and World 4 (4):436-459.
Christian Lotz (2007). Cognitivism and Practical Intentionality: A Critique of Dreyfus's Critique of Husserl. International Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2):153-166.
M. Reuter (1999). Merleau-Ponty's Notion of Pre-Reflective Intentionality. Synthese 118 (1):69--88.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads109 ( #15,303 of 1,696,808 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #64,794 of 1,696,808 )
How can I increase my downloads?