David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 128 (3):619 - 644 (2006)
We seem less likely to endorse moral expertise than reasoning expertise or aesthetic expertise. This seems puzzling given that moral norms are intuitively taken to be at least more objective than aesthetic norms. One possible diagnosis of the asymmetry is that moral judgments require autonomy of judgement in away that other judgments do not. However, the author points out that aesthetic judgments that have been ‘borrowed’ by aesthetic experts generate the same autonomy worry as moral judgments which are borrowed by moral experts. The author then explores various approaches to accepting the testimony of moral experts and concludes that the asymmetry may best be explained by (1) the conditions for moral expertise being more difficult to satisfy than those of aesthetic expertise and (2) the intuitive greater seriousness of accepting the moral judgments of others, since moral norms are generally viewed as more binding than aesthetic norms.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Religion|
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References found in this work BETA
David Owen Brink (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Nomy Arpaly (2003). Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency. Oxford University Press.
C. A. J. Coady (1992). Testimony: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press.
J. B. Schneewind (1998). The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Paulina Sliwa (2012). In Defense of Moral Testimony. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):175-195.
Hallvard Lillehammer (2014). I—Moral Testimony, Moral Virtue, and the Value of Autonomy. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):111-127.
Jon Robson (2012). Aesthetic Testimony. Philosophy Compass 7 (1):1-10.
Robert J. Howell (2014). Google Morals, Virtue, and the Asymmetry of Deference. Noûs 48 (3):389-415.
Mike Ridge (2009). Moral Assertion for Expressivists. Philosophical Issues 19 (1):182-204.
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