Conditional probability and dutch books

Philosophy of Science 67 (3):391-409 (2000)
There is no set Δ of probability axioms that meets the following three desiderata: (1) Δ is vindicated by a Dutch book theorem; (2) Δ does not imply regularity (and thus allows, among other things, updating by conditionalization); (3) Δ constrains the conditional probability q(·,z) even when the unconditional probability p(z) (=q(z,T)) equals 0. This has significant consequences for Bayesian epistemology, some of which are discussed
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/392787
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,974
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Alan Hajek (2005). Scotching Dutch Books? Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):139-151.
Alan Hájek (2005). Scotching Dutch Books? Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):139–151.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

102 ( #24,673 of 1,725,870 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

63 ( #18,483 of 1,725,870 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.