David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy 82 (1):5-22 (2007)
This paper focuses on an underappreciated issue that dreams raise for moral evaluation: is immorality possible in dreams? The evaluatiotial internalist is committed to answering ‘yes.’ This is because the internalist account of moral evaluation holds that the moral quality of a person's actions, what a person does, her agency in any given case is completely determined by factors that are internal to that agency, such as the person's motives and/or intentions. Actual production of either good or bad effects is completely irrelevant to the moral evaluation of that agency. Since agency can be expressed in a dream, the internalist is committed to dream immorality. Some may take this as a reductio of evaluational internalism, but whether or not this is the case the issue reveals what such a theory is committed to. In this paper I explore the significance of dreams to morality, and argue that the absurdity of dream immorality supports an account of moral evaluation with an externalist component, rather than a purely internalist account of moral evaluation.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Jeff Dunn (2012). Virtual Worlds and Moral Evaluation. Ethics and Information Technology 14 (4):255-265.
Similar books and articles
Caj Strandberg (2012). Expressivism and Dispositional Desires. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1):81-91.
M. Schredl & E. Doll (1998). Emotions in Diary Dreams. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (4):634-646.
Marius Timmann Mjaaland (2011). Immorality. Neue Zeitschrift Für Systematische Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 53 (4):450-464.
Linda Mealey (2000). The Illusory Function of Dreams: Another Example of Cognitive Bias. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):971-972.
M. Schredl, A. T. Funkhouser, C. M. Cornu, Hirsbrunner H.-P. & M. Bahro (2001). Reliability in Dream Research: A Methodological Note. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (4):496-502.
Paul Bloomfield (2008). The Harm of Immorality. Ratio 21 (3):241-259.
Tomoji Shogenji (2012). Internalism and Externalism in Meliorative Epistemology. Erkenntnis 76 (1):59-72.
Richard A. Hilbert (2010). The Anomalous Foundations of Dream Telling: Objective Solipsism and the Problem of Meaning. [REVIEW] Human Studies 33 (1):41-64.
Gareth B. Matthews (1981). On Being Immoral in a Dream. Philosophy 56 (January):47-64.
Kristoffer Ahlstrom (2011). Dream Skepticism and the Conditionality Problem. Erkenntnis 75 (1):45-60.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads51 ( #31,693 of 1,101,599 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #178,496 of 1,101,599 )
How can I increase my downloads?