Freedom, Resistance, Agency

In Peter Kail & Manuel Dries (eds.), Nietzsche on Mind and Nature. Oxford University Press 142–162 (2015)
While Nietzsche's rejection of metaphysical free will and moral desert has been widely recognised, the sense in which Nietzsche continues to use the term freedom affirmatively remains largely unnoticed. The aim of this article is to show that freedom and agency are among Nietzsche’s central concerns, that his much-discussed interest in power in fact originates in a first-person account of freedom, and that his understanding of the phenomenology of freedom informs his theory of agency. He develops a non-reductive drive-psychological motivational theory: reflective judgement and reasons can motivate by means of affective orientations agents have due to their drives. In particular, due to a standing desire or 'instinct for freedom' agents can generate, in mental simulations, the necessary motivational affects to unify their drives in view of certain long-term goals.
Keywords Philosophy of mind  Nietzsche, Friedrich  freedom  self-efficacy  mental simulation
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