Response to my critics

Utilitas 16 (1):33-41 (2004)
Abstract
This essay is a rejoinder to comments on Uneasy Virtue made by Onora O'Neill, John Skorupski, and Michael Slote in this issue. In Uneasy Virtue I presented criticisms of traditional virtue theory. I also presented an alternative – a consequentialist account of virtue, one which is a form of ‘pure evaluational externalism’. This type of theory holds that the moral quality of character traits is determined by factors external to agency (e.g. consequences). All three commentators took exception to this account. Therefore, the bulk of my response focuses on defending the externalist account of virtue presented in the final chapters of Uneasy Virtue.
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Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely (2012). The Virtues of Ignorance. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):335-350.
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