The Secret Chain: A Limited Defense of Sympathy

Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):234-238 (2011)
Abstract
This paper responds to criticisms of sympathy-based approaches to ethics made by Jesse Prinz, focusing on the criticism that emotions are too variable to form a basis for ethics. I draw on the idea, articulated by early sentimentalists such as Hutcheson and Hume, that proper reliance on sympathy is subject to a corrective procedure in order, in part, to avoid the variability problem.
Keywords empathy
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