Is determinism more favorable than indeterminism for the causal Markov condition?

Philosophy of Science 76 (5):662-675 (2009)
Abstract
The present text comments on Steel 2005 , in which the author claims to extend from the deterministic to the general case, the result according to which the causal Markov condition is satisfied by systems with jointly independent exogenous variables. I show that Steel’s claim cannot be accepted unless one is prepared to abandon standard causal modeling terminology. Correlatively, I argue that the most fruitful aspect of Steel 2005 consists in a realist conception of error terms, and I show how this conception sheds new light on the relationship between determinism and the causal Markov condition. †To contact the author, please write to: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, Université Catholique de Louvain, Place du Cardinal Mercier 14, 1348 Louvain la Neuve, Belgium; e‐mail: isabelle.drouet@gmail.com.
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Isabelle Drouet (2012). Causal Reasoning, Causal Probabilities, and Conceptions of Causation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (4):761-768.
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