Moral phenomenology and moral intentionality

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):35-49 (2008)
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Abstract

This paper distinguishes between two senses of the term “ phenomenology ”: a narrow sense and a broader sense. It claims, with particular reference to the moral sphere, that the narrow meaning of moral phenomenology cannot stand alone, that is, that moral phenomenology in the narrow sense entails moral intentionality. The paper proceeds by examining different examples of the axiological and volitional experiences of both virtuous and dutiful agents, and it notes the correlation between the phenomenal and intentional differences belonging to these experiences. The paper concludes with some reflections on how the focus on the broader sense of “ phenomenology ” serves to provide a more precise sense of what we might mean by “ moral phenomenology.”

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John J. Drummond
Fordham University

Citations of this work

Feeling as Consciousness of Value.Ingrid Vendrell Ferran - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (1):71-88.
Addiction and self-determination: A phenomenological approach.Jann E. Schlimme - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (1):49-62.
Emotions and Moods in Husserl’s Phenomenology.Denis Fisette - forthcoming - In Hanne Jacobs (ed.), The Husserlian Mind. New York: Routledge. pp. 220-231.
Fears as Conscious Perceivings.Kristjan Laasik - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):747-760.

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References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
Self-awareness and alterity: a phenomenological investigation.Dan Zahavi - 1999 - Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.

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