In Defense of the Smart Aleck

Abstract
In “Honderich on the Consequences of Determinism” I argued that contrary to Ted Honderich’s thesis in his How Free Are You? determinism has no consequences, whether logical, moral, or psychological, about how we must view persons we beIieve to be determined. Honderich replied in “Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and the Smart Aleck” that there is a sense in which our belief in determinism has consequences that any reasonable human being must recognize. My present paper examines Honderich’s reply
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Richard Double (1999). In Defense of the Smart Aleck: A Reply to Ted Honderich. Journal of Philosophical Research 24 (January):305-9.
Ted Honderich (1996). Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and the Smart Aleck. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):855-62.
Richard Double (1996). Honderich on the Consequences of Determinism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):847-854.
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