In Defense of the Smart Aleck
Journal of Philosophical Research 24:305-309 (1999)
| Abstract | In “Honderich on the Consequences of Determinism” I argued that contrary to Ted Honderich’s thesis in his How Free Are You? determinism has no consequences, whether logical, moral, or psychological, about how we must view persons we beIieve to be determined. Honderich replied in “Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and the Smart Aleck” that there is a sense in which our belief in determinism has consequences that any reasonable human being must recognize. My present paper examines Honderich’s reply | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesRichard Double (1999). In Defense of the Smart Aleck: A Reply to Ted Honderich. Journal of Philosophical Research 24 (January):305-9.
Ted Honderich (1996). Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and the Smart Aleck. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):855-62.
Ted Honderich (1990). The Consequences of Determinism: A Theory of Determinism, Volume 2. Clarendon Press.
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Ted Honderich (2002). How Free Are You? The Determinism Problem. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Ted Honderich (2002). Determinism as True, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as False, and the Real Alternative. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Ted Honderich (forthcoming). Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as Both False, and the Real Problem. The Determinism and Free Will Philosophy Website.
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