David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Logic Journal of the Igpl 16 (1):195--216 (2008)
A critical view of the alleged significance of Belnap four-valued logic for reasoning under inconsistent and incomplete information is provided. The difficulty lies in the confusion between truth-values and information states, when reasoning about Boolean propositions. So our critique is along the lines of previous debates on the relevance of many-valued logics and especially of the extension of the Boolean truth-tables to more than two values as a tool for reasoning about uncertainty. The critique also questions the significance of partial logic
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Heinrich Wansing (2012). A Non-Inferentialist, Anti-Realistic Conception of Logical Truth and Falsity. Topoi 31 (1):93-100.
Jan Maluszyński & Andrzej Szalas (2011). Logical Foundations and Complexity of 4QL, a Query Language with Unrestricted Negation. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 21 (2):211-232.
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