Journal of the History of Ideas 67 (3):443-464 (2006)
|Abstract||In this essay, I shall take up the theme of Galileo’s notion of cause, which has already received considerable attention. I shall argue that the participants in the debate as it stands have overlooked a striking and essential feature of Galileo’s notion of cause. Galileo not only reformed natural philosophy, he also – as I shall defend – introduced a new notion of causality and integrated it in his scientific practice (hence, this new notion also has its methodological repercussions). Galileo’s conception of causality went hand in hand with his methodology. It is my claim that Galileo was trying to construct a new scientifically useful notion of causality. This new notion of causality is an interventionist notion.|
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