Newton's notion and practice of unification

n this paper I deal with a neglected topic with respect to unification in Newton’s Principia. I will clarify Newton’s notion and practice of unification . In order to do so, I will use the recent theories on unification as tools of analysis . I will argue, after showing that neither Kitcher’s nor Schurz’s account aptly capture Newton’s notion and practice of unification, that Salmon’s later work is a good starting point for analysing this notion and its practice in the Principia. Finally, I will supplement Salmon’s account in order to answer the question at stake.Keywords: Explanation; Isaac Newton; Principia; Unification
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2004.12.004
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References found in this work BETA
Philip Kitcher (1981). Explanatory Unification. Philosophy of Science 48 (4):507-531.
Wesley C. Salmon (1989). 4 Decades of Scientific Explanation. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13:3-219.
Philip Kitcher (1989). Explanatary Unification and the Causal Structure of the World. In Philip Kitcher & Wesley Salmon (eds.), Scientific Explanation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 410-505.

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Citations of this work BETA
Steffen Ducheyne (2009). Understanding (in) Newton's Argument for Universal Gravitation. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (2):227 - 258.

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