Some Worries for Norton's Material Theory of Induction

Philosophia Naturalis 45 (1):37-46 (2008)
In this essay, I take the role as friendly commentator and call attention to three potential worries for John D. Norton’s material theory of induction. I attempt to show that his “principle argument” is based on a false dichotomy, that the idea that facts ultimately derive their license from matters of fact is debatable, and that one of the core implications of his theory is untenable for historical and fundamental reasons.
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DOI 10.3196/003180208787332387
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