Some worries for Norton's material theory of induction
| Abstract | In this essay, I take the role as friendly commentator and call attention to three potential worries for John D. Norton’s material theory of induction (Norton, 2003). I attempt to show (1) that his “principle argument” is based on a false dichotomy, (2) that the idea that facts ultimately derive their license from matters of fact is debatable, and (3) that one of the core implications of his theory is untenable for historical and fundamental reasons. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesJohn D. Norton (2011). History of Science and the Material Theory of Induction: Einstein's Quanta, Mercury's Perihelion. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):3-27.
John D. Norton (2010). There Are No Universal Rules for Induction. Philosophy of Science 77 (5):765-777.
Daniel Steel (2005). The Facts of the Matter: A Discussion of Norton's Material Theory of Induction. Philosophy of Science 72 (1):188-197.
John D. Norton (2003). A Material Theory of Induction. Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.
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