Cognitive Qualia and Functionalism
| Abstract | In this programmatic paper, I reject the argument from definitional restriction against cognitive phenomenology, reject arguments for the exhaustion of cognitive phenomenology by associated phenomenologies, offer a theory on the nature of cognitive phenomenology (the theory of inferential and associative potentials), and defend the view that cognitive phenomenology is functionally exhausted, since the standard arguments against functionalism (e.g., the inverted spectrum and absent qualia arguments) do not hold for cognitive phenomenology. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Cognitive phenomenology The phenomenology of thought Associated phenomenologies Definitional restriction Inferential and associative potentials Functionalism Functional exhaustion Inverted spectrum Absent qualia Understanding-experience | |||||||||
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