Cognitive Qualia and Functionalism

Abstract
In this programmatic paper, I reject the argument from definitional restriction against cognitive phenomenology, reject arguments for the exhaustion of cognitive phenomenology by associated phenomenologies, offer a theory on the nature of cognitive phenomenology (the theory of inferential and associative potentials), and defend the view that cognitive phenomenology is functionally exhausted, since the standard arguments against functionalism (e.g., the inverted spectrum and absent qualia arguments) do not hold for cognitive phenomenology.
Keywords Cognitive phenomenology  The phenomenology of thought  Associated phenomenologies  Definitional restriction  Inferential and associative potentials  Functionalism  Functional exhaustion  Inverted spectrum  Absent qualia  Understanding-experience
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