Graduate studies at Western
Dialogue 43 (3):471-489 (2004)
|Abstract||A quick survey of the literature reveals that authors disagree as to which sentiments are moral and which are not, they disagee as to how to distinguish between moral and other sentiments, and finally that often the same author will claim a sentiment is moral at some times but not at others. These difficulties arise, I argue, from an underlying concept of emotion that I call atomism. Viewing emotions as means of coordination among agents, rather than as psychic atoms, suggests a radically different approach to the question of morality and affects, one where emotions pave the way for normative expectations|
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