Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||In Meditation I, Descartes dismisses the possibility that he might be insane as a ground for doubting that the senses are a source of knowledge of the external world. In this paper, I argue that Descartes was justified in so doing, and draw some general epistemological conclusions from this result.|
|Keywords||Descartes Skepticism Madness Epistemology|
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|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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