Philosophical Studies 112 (3):279 - 290 (2003)
|Abstract||Alan Hájek has recently argued that certain assignments of vague probability defeat Pascals Wager. In particular, he argues that skeptical agnostics – those whose probability for God''s existence is vague over an interval containing zero – have nothing to fear from Pascal. In this paper, I make two arguments against Hájek: (1) that skeptical agnosticism is a form of dogmatism, and as such should be rejected; (2) that in any case, choice situations with vague probability assignments ought to be treated as second-order cases of choice under uncertainty, with the result that belief in God is the favored option in a very wide range of cases.|
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