Evidential externalism

Philosophical Studies 158 (3):435-455 (2012)
Consider the Evidence Question: When and under what conditions is proposition P evidence for some agent S? Silins (Philos Perspect 19:375–404, 2005) has recently offered a partial answer to the Evidence Question. In particular, Silins argues for Evidential Internalism (EI), which holds that necessarily, if A and B are internal twins, then A and B have the same evidence. In this paper I consider Silins’s argument, and offer two response on behalf of Evidential Externalism (EE), which is the denial of Evidential Internalism. The first response claims that the allegedly unattractive consequence for EE is not so unattractive. The second response takes the form of a tu quoque, demonstrating that a structurally similar argument can be constructed against EI. The two responses play off one another: objecting to the first puts pressure on one to accept the other. Taken together, the two responses have important ramifications for how we answer the Evidence Question, and how we think about evidence in general.
Keywords Evidence  Internalism  Externalism  Silins
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9680-3
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References found in this work BETA
Jonathan Vogel (2000). Reliabilism Leveled. Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602-623.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jeff Dunn (2015). Reliability for Degrees of Belief. Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1929-1952.

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Nicholas Silins (2005). Deception and Evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):375–404.
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Mark Schroeder (2011). What Does It Take to "Have" a Reason? In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press 201--22.

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