Fried Eggs, Thermodynamics, and the Special Sciences
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):71-98 (2011)
| Abstract | David Lewis ([1986b]) gives an attractive and familiar account of counterfactual dependence in the standard context. This account has recently been subject to a counterexample from Adam Elga ([2000]). In this article, I formulate a Lewisian response to Elga’s counterexample. The strategy is to add an extra criterion to Lewis’s similarity metric, which determines the comparative similarity of worlds. This extra criterion instructs us to take special science laws into consideration as well as fundamental laws. I argue that the Second Law of Thermodynamics should be seen as a special science law, and give a brief account of what Lewisian special science laws should look like. If successful, this proposal blocks Elga’s counterexample | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,631 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesAlexander Reutlinger (2011). A Theory of Non-Universal Laws. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):97 - 117.
Jaegwon Kim (2012). Against Laws in the Special Sciences. Journal of Philosophical Research 37:103-122.
Markus Schrenk (2006). A Theory for Special Science Laws. In H. Bohse & S. Walter (eds.), Selected Papers Contributed to the Sections of GAP.6. mentis.
Brad Weslake (forthcoming). Statistical Mechanical Imperialism. In Alastair Wilson (ed.), Asymmetries of Chance and Time. Oxford University Press.
Andreas Hüttemann & Alexander Reutlinger (forthcoming). Against the Statistical Account of Special Science Laws. In Vassilios Karakostas & Dennis Dieks (eds.), Recent Progress in Philosophy of Science: Perspectives and Foundational Problems. The Third European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings. Springer.
Mathias Frisch (2011). From Arbuthnot to Boltzmann: The Past Hypothesis, the Best System, and the Special Sciences. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):1001-1011.
John Earman & John Roberts (1999). C Eteris Paribus , There is No Problem of Provisos. Synthese 118 (3):439--478.
Robert Williams (2008). Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):385-420.
Amir Eshan Karbasizadeh (2008). Revising the Concept of Lawhood: Special Sciences and Natural Kinds. Synthese 162 (1):15 - 30.
Craig Callender (2004). Measures, Explanations and the Past: Should ‘Special’ Initial Conditions Be Explained? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):195-217.
Christopher J. G. Meacham (2008). Sleeping Beauty and the Dynamics of de Se Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):245-269.
James Woodward (2002). There is No Such Thing as a Ceteris Paribus Law. Erkenntnis 57 (3):303Ð328.
Jens Harbecke (forthcoming). On the Distinction Between Law Schemata and Causal Laws. Acta Analytica:1-12.
Marc Lange (2000). Natural Laws in Scientific Practice. Oxford University Press.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2010-11-04Total downloads40 ( #28,778 of 548,970 )Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,438 of 548,970 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
