David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):77-94 (2004)
In a number of important works, Jerry Fodor has wrestled with the problem of how mental representation can be accounted for within a physicalist framework. His favored response has attempted to identify nonintentional conditions for intentionality, relying on a nexus of casual relations between symbols and what they represent. I examine Fodor's theory and argue that it fails to meet its own conditions for adequacy insofar as it presupposes the very phenomenon that it purports to account for. I conclude, however, that the ontological commitments of intentional psychology survive within a broader conception of naturalism than the one adopted by Fodor
|Keywords||Mentalese Metaphysics Mind Physicalism Semantics Fodor, J|
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1990). Information and Representation. In Philip P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press
Deborah J. Brown (1996). A Furry Tile About Mental Representation. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):448-66.
Paul A. Boghossian (1991). Naturalizing Content. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell
Robert D. Rupert (1999). The Best Test Theory of Extension: First Principle(S). Mind and Language 14 (3):321–355.
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