Minimalist semantics in meta-ethical expressivism
Philosophical Studies (forthcoming)
| Abstract | James Dreier (Philos Perspect 18:23–44, 2004) states what he calls the “Problem of Creeping Minimalism”: that metaethical Expressivists can accept a series of claims about meaning, under which all of the sentences that Realists can accept are consistent with Expressivism. This would allow Expressivists to accept all of the Realist’s sentences, and as Dreier points out, make it difficult to say what the difference between the two views is. That Expressivists can accept these claims about meaning has been suggested by Simon Blackburn on behalf of his “quasi-realist”. I argue against the assumption that there is a way to interpret the Realist’s sentences in a way that renders them consistent with Expressivism. | |||||||||
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