David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (1):131-139 (2007)
To solve the highly counterintuitive paradox of confirmation represented by the statement, “A pair of red shoes confirms that all ravens are black,” Hempel employed a strategy that retained the equivalence condition but abandoned Nicod’s irrelevance condition. However, his use of the equivalence condition is fairly ad hoc, raising doubts about its applicability to this problem. Furthermore, applying the irrelevance condition from Nicod’s criterion does not necessarily lead to paradoxes, nor does discarding it prevent the emergence of paradoxes. Hempel’s approach fails to adequately resolve the paradox.
|Keywords||paradoxes of confirmation Nicod’s criterion equivalence condition Hempel|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Florian F. Schiller (2012). Why Bayesians Needn't Be Afraid of Observing Many Non-Black Non-Ravens. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 43 (1):77-88.
Pierre Le Morvan (1999). The Converse Consequence Condition and Hempelian Qualitative Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):448-.
C. H. Whiteley (1945). Hempel's Paradoxes of Confirmation. Mind 54 (214):156-158.
Luca Moretti (2003). Why the Converse Consequence Condition Cannot Be Accepted. Analysis 63 (4):297–300.
G. H. Merrill (1979). Confirmation and Prediction. Philosophy of Science 46 (1):98-117.
Leif Eriksen (1989). Confirmation, Paradox, and Logic. Philosophy of Science 56 (4):681-687.
Severin Schroeder (2009). Hempel's Paradox, Law-Likeness and Causal Relations. Philosophical Investigations 32 (3):244-263.
Phillip J. Rody (1978). (C) Instances, the Relevance Criterion, and the Paradoxes of Confirmation. Philosophy of Science 45 (2):289-302.
Branden Fitelson (2006). The Paradox of Confirmation. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.
R. G. Swinburne (1971). The Paradoxes of Confirmation - a Survey. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (4):318 - 330.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads26 ( #79,354 of 1,692,491 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #111,548 of 1,692,491 )
How can I increase my downloads?