David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 13 (1):123-148 (2000)
In his book The rediscovery of the mind John Searle claims that unconscious mental states (1) have first-person "aspectual shape", but (2) that their ontology is purely third-person. He attempts to eliminate the obvious inconsistency by arguing that the aspectual shape of unconscious mental states consists in their ability to cause conscious first-person states. However, I show that this attempted solution fails insofar as it covertly acknowledges that unconscious states lack the aspectual shape required for them to play a role in psychological explanation
|Keywords||Mind Psychology Science Unconscious Searle, J|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Itay Shani (2007). Consciousness and the First Person. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (12):57-91.
Anthonie W. M. Meijers (2000). Physical and Mental? Reply to John Searle. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (2):179 – 183.
David H. Finkelstein (1999). On the Distinction Between Conscious and Unconscious States of Mind. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (2):79-100.
John McLoughlin (1999). Unwittingly Recapitulating Freud: Searle's Concept of a Vocabulary of the Unconscious. Ratio 12 (1):34-53.
Jeffrey Hershfield (1997). Searle's Regimen for Rediscovering the Mind. Dialogue 36 (2):361-374.
Eric Gillett (1996). Searle and the "Deep Unconscious". Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (3):191-200.
Anthonie W. M. Meijers (2000). Mental Causation and Searle's Impossible Conception of Unconscious Intentionality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (2):155-170.
Max Velmans (1990). Is the Mind Conscious, Functional or Both? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):629-630.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads46 ( #35,230 of 1,098,955 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #22,384 of 1,098,955 )
How can I increase my downloads?