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- Charles E. M. Dunlop (2000). Searle's Unconscious Mind. Philosophical Psychology 13 (1):123-148.In his book The rediscovery of the mind John Searle claims that unconscious mental states (1) have first-person "aspectual shape", but (2) that their ontology is purely third-person. He attempts to eliminate the obvious inconsistency by arguing that the aspectual shape of unconscious mental states consists in their ability to cause conscious first-person states. However, I show that this attempted solution fails insofar as it covertly acknowledges that unconscious states lack the aspectual shape required for them to play a role in psychological explanation.In my reading list | Discuss this article | Edit | Categorize |My bibliography
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