David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 13 (1):123-148 (2000)
In his book The rediscovery of the mind John Searle claims that unconscious mental states (1) have first-person "aspectual shape", but (2) that their ontology is purely third-person. He attempts to eliminate the obvious inconsistency by arguing that the aspectual shape of unconscious mental states consists in their ability to cause conscious first-person states. However, I show that this attempted solution fails insofar as it covertly acknowledges that unconscious states lack the aspectual shape required for them to play a role in psychological explanation
|Keywords||Mind Psychology Science Unconscious Searle, J|
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References found in this work BETA
John R. Searle (1980). Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
John R. Searle (1994). The Connection Principle and the Ontology of the Unconscious: A Reply to Fodor and Lepore. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):847-55.
Brian J. Garrett (1995). Non-Reductionism and John Searle's The Rediscovery of the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):209-215.
Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepore (1994). What Is The Connection Principle? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):837 - 845.
Robert Van Gulick (1995). Review: Why the Connection Argument Doesn't Work. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):201 - 207.
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