Wittgenstein on sensation and 'seeing-as'

Synthese 60 (September):349-368 (1984)
This essay begins by providing a new account of wittgenstein's private language argument. Wittgenstein's rejection of a "cartesian" account of mind is examined, And it is argued that this rejection carries no commitment to behaviorism, Or to the view that sensation terms have public meanings and private references. Part ii of the essay attempts to forge a link between the two parts of the "philosophical investigations", By arguing that wittgenstein's discussion of "seeing-As" reinforces and illuminates his account of how sensation language is mastered
Keywords Epistemology  Expression  Language  Sensation  Wittgenstein
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DOI 10.1007/BF00485563
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