Journal for General Philosophy of Science 36 (2):401 - 407 (2005)
|Abstract||Depending on the realist or instrumentalist twist that is given to positivism, interesting arguments can be made for both causal and classical theories of reference with regard to the use of scientific terms in the language of theory. But my claim is that the rigid foundationalism that supports the theoretical terms via the correspondence rules of the Received View undercuts the notion that it is possible to argue coherently for a causal theory of reference as allied to a positivistic view|
|Keywords||instrumentalism logical empiricism positivism realism|
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