David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophia 29 (1-4):241-252 (2002)
Bringing to bear two major lines of argument, I claim that foundationalism is vitiated by its reliance (in its various forms) on privileged access, and by its noninstantiability. The notion of privileged access is examined, and the status of propositions said to be evocative of privileged access addressed. Noninstantiability is viewed through the current project of naturalizing epistemology, and naturalized alternatives to the rigorous foundationalism of the normative epistemologists are brought forward
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Ethics Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Renia Gasparatou (2013). Naturalising Austin. Acta Analytica 28 (3):329-343.
Similar books and articles
Michael Bergmann (2004). What's NOT Wrong with Foundationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):161–165.
Robert Schroer (2008). Memory Foundationalism and the Problem of Unforgotten Carelessness. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):74–85.
Scott F. Aikin (2005). Who is Afraid of Epistemology's Regress Problem? Philosophical Studies 126 (2):191 - 217.
Jane Duran (1995). Chisholmian Foundationalism and the Naturalization of Epistemology. Critica 27 (81):55 - 78.
Jane Duran (2000). Naturalized Foundationalism. Critica 32 (94):29 - 41.
Peter Tramel (2008). Haack's Foundherentism is a Foundationalism. Synthese 160 (2):215 - 228.
Daniel Howard-Snyder & Christian Lee (2005). On a “Fatal Dilemma” for Moderate Foundationalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:251-259.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1984). What is Wrong with Minimal Foundationalism? Erkenntnis 21 (2):175-184.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1986). The Confusion Over Foundationalism. Philosophia 16 (3-4):345-354.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads44 ( #43,881 of 1,413,175 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #67,254 of 1,413,175 )
How can I increase my downloads?