The Failure of Type-4 Arguments from Evil, in the Face of the Consequential Complexity of History

Philo 8 (2):109-122 (2005)
Bruce Russell has classified evidential arguments from evil into four types, one of which is the type-4 argument. Rather than begin with observations of evils that appear to be gratuitous, type-4 arguments simply begin with observations of evils. The next step, and the heart of a type-4 argument, is an abductive inference (inference to the best explanation) from those observations, to the conclusion that there is gratuitous evil. Reflection upon the consequential complexity of history, however, reveals that we have no objective grounds for making the key, abductive inference, thus, all type-4 arguments from evil fail
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DOI 10.5840/philo2005824
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Justin P. McBrayer (2010). Skeptical Theism. Philosophy Compass 5 (7):611-623.

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