The Buridanian Account of Inferential Relations between Doubly Quantified Propositions: a Proof of Soundness
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (3):225-243 (2004)
On the basis of passages from John Buridan's Summula Suppositionibus and Sophismata, E. Karger has reconstructed what could be called the ?Buridanian theory of inferential relations between doubly quantified propositions?, presented in her 1993 article ?A theory of immediate inference contained in Buridan's logic?. In the reconstruction, she focused on the syntactical elements of Buridan's theory of modes of personal supposition to extract patterns of formally valid inferences between members of a certain class of basic categorical propositions. The present study aims at offering semantic corroboration?a proof of soundness?to the inferential relations syntactically identified by E. Karger, by means of the analysis of Buridan's semantic definitions of the modes of personal supposition. The semantic analysis is done with the help of some modern logical concepts, in particular that of the model. In effect, the relations of inference syntactically established are shown to hold also from a semantic point of view, which means thus that this fragment of Buridan's logic can be said to be sound
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Ian Pratt-Hartmann (2011). The Hamiltonian Syllogistic. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 20 (4):445-474.
Similar books and articles
Catarina Dutilh Novaes (2004). The Buridanian Account of Inferential Relations Between Doubly Quantified Propositions: A Proof of Soundness. History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (3):225-243.
Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe (2003). John Buridan and Jerónimo Pardo on the Notion of Propositio. In R. L. Friedman & S. Ebbesen (eds.), John Buridan and Beyond. Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters. 89--153.
Catarina Dutilh Novaes (2005). Buridan's Consequentia: Consequence and Inference Within a Token-Based Semantics. History and Philosophy of Logic 26 (4):277-297.
Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe (2004). Complexio, Enunciatio, Assensus: The Role of Propositions in Knowledge According to John Buridan. In A. Maierù & L. Valente (eds.), Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-Assertive Language. Leo S. Olschki.
C. Dutilh Novaes (2005). Medieval Obligationes as Logical Games of Consistency Maintenance. Synthese 145 (3):371 - 395.
Stephen Read (2012). John Buridan's Theory of Consequence and His Octagons of Opposition. In J.-Y. Beziau & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Around and Beyond the Square of Opposition. Birkhäuser. 93--110.
Gyula Klima (2004). Consequences of a Closed, Token-Based Semantics: The Case of John Buridan. History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (2):95-110.
Christoph Benzmüller & Lawrence C. Paulson (2013). Quantified Multimodal Logics in Simple Type Theory. Logica Universalis 7 (1):7-20.
Guido Melchior (2010). Knowledge-Closure and Inferential Knowledge. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (30):259-285.
Edgar Andrade-Lotero & Catarina Dutilh Novaes (2012). A Contentious Trinity: Levels of Entailment in Brandom's Pragmatist Inferentialism. Philosophia 40 (1):41-53.
Jaroslav Peregrin (2010). Inferentializing Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3):255 - 274.
Gyula Klima (2009). John Buridan. Oxford University Press.
Michael J. Fitzgerald (2006). Problems with Temporality and Scientific Propositions in John Buridan and Albert of Saxony. Vivarium 44 (s 2-3):305-337.
Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe (1996). The Doctrine of Descent in Jerónimo Pardo: Meaning, Inference, Truth. In I. Angelelli & M. Cerezo (eds.), Studies on the History of Logic. Walter de Gruyter.
Added to index2010-09-02
Total downloads8 ( #240,229 of 1,696,445 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #339,109 of 1,696,445 )
How can I increase my downloads?