The Different Ways in which Logic is (said to be) Formal

History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (4):303 - 332 (2011)
Abstract
What does it mean to say that logic is formal? The short answer is: it means (or can mean) several different things. In this paper, I argue that there are (at least) eight main variations of the notion of the formal that are relevant for current discussions in philosophy and logic, and that they are structured in two main clusters, namely the formal as pertaining to forms, and the formal as pertaining to rules. To the first cluster belong the formal as schematic; the formal as indifference to particulars; the formal as topic-neutrality; the formal as abstraction from intentional content; the formal as de-semantification. To the second cluster belong the formal as computable; the formal as pertaining to regulative rules; the formal as pertaining to constitutive rules. I analyze each of these eight variations, providing their historical background and raising related philosophical questions. The significance of this work of ?conceptual archeology? is that it may enhance clarity in debates where the notion of the formal plays a prominent role (such as debates where it is expected to play a demarcating role), but where it is oftentimes used equivocally and/or imprecisely
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,948
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
John Corcoran, Schema. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Hartry Field (1996). The a Prioricity of Logic. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:359 - 379.
Hartry Field (2009). What is the Normative Role of Logic? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):251-268.

View all 19 references

Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Barry Smith & David Murray (1981). Logic, Form and Matter. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 55:47 - 74.
Paul St Denis & Patrick Grim (1997). Fractal Images of Formal Systems. Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (2):181-222.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-10-19

Total downloads

36 ( #47,533 of 1,100,791 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

5 ( #58,638 of 1,100,791 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.