Freedom of Will and the Value of Choice

Social Theory and Practice 37 (2):256-284 (2011)
Many argue that our reasons to value choice do not depend on our having libertarian free will.The paper argues against this view. One reason to value choice is that it is constitutive of a life of self-determination. If choices are determined, however, they can be predicted and brought about by others; and if choices are randomly indeterministic, they can be mimicked. In either case, the importance of choice to self-determination is challenged. Thus, it is only as long as our choices are free in a libertarian manner that the importance of choice as a means to self-determination makes full sense
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