K modálnímu ontologickému důkazu

Studia Neoaristotelica 1 (1/2):33-69 (2004)
De argumento ontologico modaliIn haec dissertatione variae formae sic dicti „secundi seu modalis argumenti ontologici“ a nostrae auctoribus (inde a N. Malcolmio usque ad P. Tichý) propositae examinantur. Tria praecipua huius argumenti praesupposita deteguntur ac perpenduntur. Difficultatem maximam, qua argumentum omnibus in formis laboret, in existentia necessaria Deo tribuenda sitam esse demonstratur. Si enim huiusmodi existentia Deo tribueretur, nullum mundum possibilem talem existere dicendum esset, in quo Deus non adesset. Talem vero mundum possibilem non occurere falsum esse videtur.On the Modal Ontological Argument.The article deals with various modal versions of the ontological argument from N. Malcolm’s to P. Tichý’s interpretation of Anselm’s second proof. Three key presuppositions of the modal proof are pin-pointed and examined. The principal problem with the proof seems to be the notion of necessary existence attributed to God. More precisely, the question is whether this is not too strong an attribute, for then there would not be a situation, i.e. a possible world, consistently thinkable which precludes the existence of God. However, this seems to be wrong
Keywords Catholic Tradition  History of Philosophy  Philosophy and Religion
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ISBN(s) 1214-8407
DOI 10.5840/studneoar200411/24
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