David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
History and Philosophy of Logic 17 (1-2):141-154 (1996)
There have been and continue to be disagreements about how to consider the traditional square of opposition and the traditional inferences of obversion, conversion, contraposition and inversion from the perspective of contemporary quantificational logic. Philosophers have made many different attempts to save traditional inferences that are invalid when they involve empty classes. I survey some of these attempts and argue that the only satisfactory way of saving all the traditional inferences is to make the existential assumption that both the subject and predicate classes and their complement classes are non-empty for all the propositions we admit. I briefly indicate the room for continued controversy over how properly to interpret Aristotle?s statements regarding these inferences, but find some plausibility in the views of Manley Thompson and A.N.Prior that Aristotle had in mind a particular arrangement of existential import unfamiliar to most contemporary logicians
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Peter Alexander (1969). An Introduction to Logic. New York, Schocken Books.
Aristotle (1984). The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. Princeton University Press.
Michael Clark (1980). The Place of Syllogistic in Logical Theory. Nottingham University Press.
P. Coffey (1938). The Science of Logic. New York, P. Smith.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
George Englebretsen (2002). Syllogistic: Old Wine in New Bottles. History and Philosophy of Logic 23 (1):31-35.
R. Lanier Anderson (2008). Review: Comments on Wayne Martin, Theories of Judgment. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (1):91-108.
Wolfgang Lenzen (2008). Ploucquet's “Refutation” of the Traditional Square of Opposition. Logica Universalis 2 (1):43-58.
Guy Politzer (2003). No Problem for Aristotle's Subject and Predicate. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):298-299.
Víctor Sánchez Valencia (1997). Head or Tail? De Morgan on the Bounds of Traditional Logic. History and Philosophy of Logic 18 (3):123-138.
Terence Parsons (2008). Things That Are Right with the Traditional Square of Opposition. Logica Universalis 2 (1):3-11.
W. Bednarowski (1955). Hamilton's Quantification of the Predicate. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56:217 - 240.
Michael V. Wedin (1990). Negation and Quantification in Aristotle. History and Philosophy of Logic 11 (2):131-150.
Terence Parsons, The Traditional Square of Opposition. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Phillip H. Wiebe (1991). Existential Assumptions for Aristotelian Logic. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:321-328.
Added to index2010-08-10
Total downloads21 ( #82,692 of 1,102,744 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #46,741 of 1,102,744 )
How can I increase my downloads?