In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind, Vol. 2: Culture and Cognition. Oxford University Press (2006)
|Abstract||A nativist moral psychology, modeled on the successes of theoretical linguistics, provides the best framework for explaining the acquisition of moral capacities and the diversity of moral judgment across the species. After a brief presentation of a poverty of the moral stimulus argument, this chapter sketches a view according to which a so-called Universal Moral Grammar provides a set of parameterizable principles whose specific values are set by the child's environment, resulting in the acquisition of a moral idiolect. The principles and parameters approach predicts moral diversity, but does not entail moral relativism.|
|Keywords||moral judgment moral stimulus universal moral grammar|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
William L. Reese (1960). Analogy, Symbolism, and Linguistic Analysis. The Review of Metaphysics 13 (3):447 - 468.
W. Gay (1980). Analogy and Metaphor: Two Models of Linguistic. Philosophy and Social Criticism 7 (3-4):300-317.
Robert J. Rafalko (1989). Corporate Punishment: A Proposal. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 8 (12):917 - 928.
Jiri Syrovatka (2000). Analogy and Understanding. Theoria 15 (3):435-450.
Michael J. Wreen (2007). A Second Form of Argument From Analogy. Theoria 73 (3):221-239.
John M. Mikhail (2011). Elements of Moral Cognition: Rawls' Linguistic Analogy and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment. Cambridge University Press.
Antonio Donato (2003). The Role of Focus in Aquinas's Doctrine of Analogy. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 77:289-301.
Ron Mallon (2008). Reviving Rawls's Linguistic Analogy Inside and Out. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 2.
Susan Dwyer (2009). Moral Dumbfounding and the Linguistic Analogy: Methodological Implications for the Study of Moral Judgment. Mind and Language 24 (3):274-296.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads68 ( #15,755 of 722,837 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #14,877 of 722,837 )
How can I increase my downloads?