Moral Requiredness: Bridging the Gap between "Ought" and "Is": Part II

Journal of Religious Ethics 9 (1):131 - 150 (1981)
Part I of this essay described "Ought" and "Value" as forms of moral requiredness. Now in Part II, a description of the ideal conditions for veridical perceptions of moral requiredness are specified. This is done in the form of an ideal observer type of analysis. This analysis is defended against those who oppose naturalism by assuming a bifurcation between 'ought' and 'is' and those who accuse naturalism of a "naturalistic fallacy." It is argued that theistic versions of the ideal observer form of analysis exist in the Christian tradition in logically acceptable and plausible formulations. Specific illustrations are provided.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 19,950
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Jason Kawall (2006). On the Moral Epistemology of Ideal Observer Theories. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):359 - 374.
Kai Nielsen (1982). God and the Basis of Morality. Journal of Religious Ethics 10 (2):335 - 350.
John Mizzoni (2003). Environ-Moral Realism. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:191-221.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

19 ( #189,766 of 1,792,099 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #281,799 of 1,792,099 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.