Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy

Routledge (2008)
In this refreshingly original and accessible investigation into the nature of metaphysics, Heather Dyke argues that for too long philosophy has suffered from a language fixation. Where this language fixation leads philosophers to reason badly, she calls it the ‘‘representational fallacy’’. She illustrates the various ways it can lead philosophers astray and argues that metaphysics can be better done without it. She discusses the philosophy of time as an illustration of how a metaphysical debate about the nature of time was needlessly transformed into a sterile debate about language and of how, once the focus on language is dropped, a new metaphysical strategy emer- ges. Dyke shows how the same applies to other debates in metaphysics and how this promises fruitful new research programmes, where the focus is on ontology rather than on language. The clear and accessible way in which current practice in metaphysics is brought under the spotlight will challenge philosophers to examine their own methodology.
Keywords Metaphysics  Language  Time
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book $109.00 used (25% off)   $128.09 new (12% off)   $145.00 direct from Amazon    Amazon page
Call number BD111.M5525 2007
ISBN(s) 0415956692   9780415956697     9780203933718   9781135910303   9781135910297   9781135910259
DOI 10.1093/analys/anp114
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,974
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
Chapters BETA
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

11 ( #213,487 of 1,725,806 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #268,283 of 1,725,806 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.