Journal of Philosophical Research 28:65-81 (2003)
|Abstract||If, as the new B-theory of time maintains, tensed sentences have tenseness truth conditions, it follows that it is possible for two sentence-tokens to have the same truth conditions but different meanings. This conclusion forces a rethink of the traditional identification of truth-conditions with meaning. There is an aspect of the meanings of tensed sentences that is not captured by their truth conditions, and that has so far eluded explanation. In this paper I intend to locate, examine, and explain this feature of tensed meaning.|
|Keywords||Time truth conditions B-theory meaning tense|
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