Mathematics and conceptual analysis

Synthese 161 (1):67–88 (2008)
Abstract
Gödel argued that intuition has an important role to play in mathematical epistemology, and despite the infamy of his own position, this opinion still has much to recommend it. Intuitions and folk platitudes play a central role in philosophical enquiry too, and have recently been elevated to a central position in one project for understanding philosophical methodology: the so-called ‘Canberra Plan’. This philosophical role for intuitions suggests an analogous epistemology for some fundamental parts of mathematics, which casts a number of themes in recent philosophy of mathematics (concerning a priority and fictionalism, for example) in revealing new light.
Keywords Intuitions  Platitudes  Conceptual analysis  Foundations of mathematics  Fictionalism
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Antony Eagle, Mathematics and conceptual analysis
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
George Boolos (1971). The Iterative Conception of Set. Journal of Philosophy 68 (8):215-231.
Philip Kitcher (1980). A Priori Knowledge. Philosophical Review 89 (1):3-23.

View all 17 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

165 ( #3,861 of 1,096,714 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

29 ( #3,084 of 1,096,714 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.