Randomness and Probability

Abstract
Von Mises thought that an adequate account of objective probability required a condition of randomness. For frequentists, some such condition is needed to rule out those sequences where the relative frequencies converge towards definite limiting values, and where it is nevertheless not appropriate to speak of probability … [because such a sequence] obeys an easily recognizable law (von Mises, Probability, Statistics, and Truth). But is a condition of randomness required for an adequate account of probability, given the existence of decisive arguments against frequentism? To put it another way: is it characteristic of the probability role that probability should have a connection to randomness? I will answer this question in the negative
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,337
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-05-31

Total downloads

39 ( #41,667 of 1,096,600 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #258,571 of 1,096,600 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.