|Abstract||Von Mises thought that an adequate account of objective probability required a condition of randomness. For frequentists, some such condition is needed to rule out those sequences where the relative frequencies converge towards definite limiting values, and where it is nevertheless not appropriate to speak of probability … [because such a sequence] obeys an easily recognizable law (von Mises, Probability, Statistics, and Truth). But is a condition of randomness required for an adequate account of probability, given the existence of decisive arguments against frequentism? To put it another way: is it characteristic of the probability role that probability should have a connection to randomness? I will answer this question in the negative|
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