Twenty-one arguments against propensity analyses of probability

Erkenntnis 60 (3):371–416 (2004)
Abstract
I argue that any broadly dispositional analysis of probability will either fail to give an adequate explication of probability, or else will fail to provide an explication that can be gainfully employed elsewhere (for instance, in empirical science or in the regulation of credence). The diversity and number of arguments suggests that there is little prospect of any successful analysis along these lines.
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    Antony Eagle (2004). A Causal Theory of Chance? [REVIEW] Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (4):883-890.

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