David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 24 (2):139-148 (2009)
Quine famously argued that analyticity is indefinable, since there is no good account of analyticity in terms of synonymy, and intensions are of no help since there are no intensions. Yet if there are intensions, the question still remains as to the right account of analyticity in terms of them. On the assumption that intensions must be admitted, the present paper considers two such accounts. The first analyzes analyticity in terms of concept identity, and the second analyzes analyticity in terms of the analysis relation. The first fails in light of possible counterexamples. The second is defended, both by considering test cases of intuitively clear analyticities, and by developing the account in light of possible counterexamples
|Keywords||Analyticity Analysis Intensions Concepts Conceptual analysis|
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References found in this work BETA
Willard V. O. Quine (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
W. V. Quine (1976). The Ways of Paradox, and Other Essays. Harvard University Press.
Robert Hanna (2001). Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
W. V. Quine (1951). Main Trends in Recent Philosophy: Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review 60 (1):20--43.
Stewart Shapiro (2000). The Status of Logic. In Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori. Oxford University Press 333--338.
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